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Abstract
Mandatory programs for old-age benefits tend to require periodic adjustments due to demographic and
economic uncertainty. Relying on discretionary legislation for these Social Security adjustments creates
political risk for workers and beneficiaries, and it can also raise risks borne by taxpayers. An alternative
approach is rule-based adjustment, as in the case of funded mutual funds and life insurance plans that
offer annuities. This paper argues that rule-based adjustments can be adopted in an unfunded system,
without incurring transition costs and without increasing the public debt. We evaluate an approach to this
problem which would endow the Trust Fund with property rights over the revenue of a (much reduced)
residual payroll tax paid by future workers. Revenue on the future taxes would be securitized and the
resulting securities priced in financial markets. The new securities created in the process would allow
beneficiaries to obtain safe real pensions protected from investment risk.
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Chapter 12
Market Innovations to Better Allocate
Generational Risk
Salvador Valdés-Prieto

In Western nations and Japan, social security payroll taxes are mainly used
to pay benefits to middle-class workers. These systems operate like a mandatory old-age annuity-saving scheme paying a rate of return below market
rates for similarly long-term and illiquid saving. In many these nations, two
issues are of primary concern. First, these social security systems face
prospective or actual insolvency, meaning they will be unable to fulfill
benefit promises unless benefits are cut or taxes are raised. Second, and
much less well known, these systems offer large opportunities for improving risk-sharing and reducing political risk. In this chapter we explore these
opportunities and argue that substantial gains are available, without incurring transition costs and without increasing the public debt. These gains
could be available to facilitate resolution of systemic long-term insolvency
in social security schemes.

Political Risk and Social Security Adjustments
Pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) social security systems are often forced to adapt
when subject to demographic, economic, and other shocks. In practice,
these changes tend to occur via emergency changes in legislation, with the
sponsoring government seeking to restore order while maintaining systemwide control. In such cases, politicians are often forced to consider the
demands of critical interest groups and constituencies who influence the
political process. Accordingly, politicians confronted with present-focused
interest groups are apt to delay dealing with economic and demographic
shocks as long as possible, rather than concerning themselves enough with
future generations’ well-being (Holzmann et al. 2005).
In the past, emergency legislation has been used to alter many system
parameters including retirement ages and eligibility rules, benefit formulas, the period over which past earnings are averaged, the indexation of
past earnings, the indexing rate for benefits in payment, coverage and
levels of payroll taxes, and more. Such parametric changes seem highly
unpredictable from the viewpoint of individual workers and pensioners,
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transforming the mandatory old-age system into a lottery where parties may
experience either huge gains or huge losses, depending on whether they
are lucky or take cuts. Such political risk also impinges on national fiscal
health, because social security programs tend to loom large relative to
government budgets. For this reason, social security insolvency can boost
the risk premium required by holders of public debt, which in turn damages taxpayers and beneficiaries of federal transfers in unpredictable ways.
Of course, policy discretion can sometimes be a valuable tool, if used to
deal with uncertainty that cannot be pooled at low cost. For example,
subsidies for disadvantaged groups which may appear in the future may
be developed ex post, at the discretion of future legislators. Nevertheless,
discretion in social security systems to date often appears to have been
more harmful than beneficial, to date. A possible response would be to
improve the way that government discretion works. For example, in Sweden, automatic stabilizers were built into benefit formulas for their notional accounts, as a means of preserving the traditional PAYGO financing
approach for the old-age system. Yet political risk remains, since such
schemes do not attain full financial stability in the face of economic and
demographic shocks. Moreover, if government-controlled funds are
invested in corporate securities, they can be subject to ‘socially targeted’
political investment rules which might curtail participant returns. Having
the government control the Trust Fund investments may expose a social
security system to political and social suasion at the expense of the economy’s performance (Cogan and Mitchell 2003).
Evidence on Political Risk. When social security systems run short of
financing, interest groups may oppose even minor changes today—even if
these changes would improve the system’s long-term sustainability (Müller
2003). Reluctance to take on reforms is often sustained by efforts to suppress
information about the financial status of social security programs. For
example, in the USA, policymakers have habitually truncated the social
security liability computation at an arbitrary seventy-five-year horizon, which
severely understates the full scope of the problems faces (Gokhale and
Smetters 2003; Kotlikoff and Burns 2004). In Europe some governments
have actually boosted pension generosity during the 1990s (Boldrin et al.
1999), due to lack of awareness of the financing consequences of doing so.1
There is also ample evidence that social security benefits are often
changed quite arbitrarily, when the political need arises. For instance, the
US Congress cut benefits in 1977, reducing promises by 19 percent for
workers age 62 in 1980, and by 30 percent for those age 54 and younger in
1980. It also subjected more benefits to taxes, thus dropping replacement
rates by about 7 percent, and raised the retirement age which will cut
replacement rates by 14 percent when fully phased in. Other nations
have seen even sharper cuts, as in the case of retirees in Russia and other
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former Soviet Union countries during the 1990s. The Mexican social
security system had promised benefits that replaced 40–80 percent of
preretirement earnings plus health benefits in the 1970s, but when the
1982 debt crisis struck, the government defaulted on these promises with
inflation over 50 percent per annum decimating real payments.2 A similar
history of fiscal unsustainability explains the benefit cuts behind the 1980
Chilean pension reform, the 1994 Argentinean reform, the 1993 Peruvian
reform, and many others. The lottery aspect of political risk is evident in
the case of Hungary: after a large shock to real wages and four legislated
changes to the indexation of different components of the pension formula
1991–7, the benefits of retirees 1986–90 averaged 20–25 percent higher
than those for persons who retired later (Augusztinovics et al. 2002). Holst
(2005) calculates that political risk creates a welfare loss equivalent to 2–4
percent of the pension amount in the USA and Germany (Holst 2005).
A Better Representation of Social Security Finances. A symptom of this
present focus is the reluctance to publish an annual balance sheet such as that
in Table 12-1, illustrating the long-term insolvency problems facing a national
social security system. If benefit and tax parameters are such that expected
cash flows require the sponsor to provide additional future support to keep
the system going, as in the right-hand panel of Table 12-1, the social security
program is said to be insolvent.3 Conversely, if the program’s assets (the
PAYGO asset is defined below) are large enough to cover all anticipated
liabilities, the social security program would be said to be solvent. The
‘Implicit Fiscal Liability’ (IFL) represents the gap—namely the present
discounted value of the expected support to be provided by the federal
government over the infinite horizon (following Geanokoplos et al. 1999).
The economics literature has shown that PAYGO social security system
debt is similar to public debt (Auerbach and Kotlikoff 1987). That is,
economically rational participants who contributed in the past perceive
Table 12-1 Balance Sheets for Partially Funded Retirement Systems
Solvent Plan
Assets
Pension Fund

Liabilities
Payments promised
to current members,
retired and active

PAYGO
Asset

Source: Valdés-Prieto (2005a).

Insolvent Plan
Assets
Pension Fund
PAYGO Asset
Implicit Fiscal
Liability

Liabilities
Payments promised
to current
members,
retired and active
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benefit promises as akin to public debt, both in their household portfolios
and in the national public finance balance sheet. Indeed, in a world with no
uncertainty, implicit social security debt and ordinary public debt are
perfect substitutes; the subsidy received by the initial generation of retirees
in a PAYGO plan equals the present value of the net lifetime taxes (see
later) that must be levied on future generations (Geanokoplos et al. 1999;
Sinn 2000).
While the accrued liability does not depend on whether social security
uses pure PAYGO finance, partial funding or full funding, there are differences across countries in the way the benefits are paid for. A partially
funded social security system, such as that in the USA, backs part of its
accrued liability with a Trust Fund, with the remainder of the liability
financed by the promise of two types of hidden or implicit future tax
revenue. Let us define the net lifetime tax levied by social security on a
particular generation, as the difference between the present discounted
value of the payroll taxes that this generation expects to pay, and the
expected discounted value of benefits that this same generation expects
to collect. When this net lifetime tax is positive, the social security program
collects a positive cash flow from this generation. It is useful to think of the
present value of future net lifetime taxes as an asset, which here we shall call
a PAYGO asset (see Table 12-1). A solvent PAYGO-financed system levies
a positive net lifetime tax on the average generation, because the payroll tax is larger than the expected present discounted value of benefits
accrued, when the economy is dynamically efficient. If the system is insolvent, there are two implicit taxes: one is the net lifetime tax whose revenue is
the PAYGO asset, and the other is the potential new tax needed to finance
the Implicit Fiscal Liability (IFL, see Table 12-1), if benefits promises are
honored.
Long-term system solvency then requires that the present value of future
promised benefits is no larger than the PAYGO asset, without requiring
additional revenue support. In the US case, the social security system faces
insolvency since the PAYGO asset is approximately $11 trillion less than the
present value of future benefits promised (Cogan and Mitchell 2003). In
terms of Table 12-1, the IFL is $11 trillion is promised benefits are honored.
However, under current law, the system may not collect additional revenue
beyond the PAYGO asset. What this means is that when the Trust Fund runs
out, the system cannot legally continue paying promised benefits. In terms
of Table 12-1, if promised benefits are not honored the IFL disappears.

Moving to a Market-Based Social Security System
Compared to politically vulnerable social security systems, we propose that a
market-based approach would offer many advantages. The idea would be to
establish individual accounts with a rule-based approach to risk allocation,
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a concept familiar from financial contracts. As an example, mutual funds
regularly stipulate that fund shares will be priced daily at the ‘net asset
value’, a concept that refers to the net value of all securities held by the
fund at yesterday’s closing price, divided by the number of outstanding
shares. Under this rule, capital market risks are shared by participants in
proportion to the number of shares each holds. This approach is also what
DC pensions do. A different rule-based approach applies to the lifetime real
annuity contract sold by life insurance companies. Here the annuitant is
generally exempted from bearing investment and inflation risk (assuming
the pension benefit is indexed to the CPI); these risks, instead, are absorbed
by the insurer’s capital and the issuers of the inflation-indexed bonds in
which the life insurance company’s investments are held.
Of course other risk-sharing rules are possible, but these two have the
advantage of having legal support. Rules of this sort also offer transparency
which can improve the policy process itself and reduce political risk. Such
rules also allow workers to diversify and trade the underlying risks in the
financial markets, and to choose among diverse balanced portfolios. And
finally, financial regulators would be less subject to conflicts of interest
created by being subordinate to the same political coalition that experiences reelection concerns. Nevertheless, a rule-based approach must rely
on the accounts to have capital assets backing the promises, which many
PAYGO social security systems lack. That is, if financial markets are to take
on a risk-sharing role in the case of social security, we must confront the
question of where the money comes from to fund the system.
Securitization of Future PAYGO Taxes. Our proposal would devise a new
financing mechanism that does not increase the public debt. It does not
require decade-long consumption sacrifices because it does not redistribute
across generations. This approach involves five steps (Valdés-Prieto 2002,
2005a):
(1) Determine what additional social security tax would be required over
and above the current payroll tax, to honor current benefit promises
for an infinite horizon. Also determine how much benefit promises
would have to be cut below the current promises (say by reducing the
degree of wage indexation of past earnings to calculate initial benefits), to finance a solvent system with the current payroll tax. Choose
some combination between these extremes, appealing to the gains of
the next steps in the reform.
(2) In the reformed system, determine the size of average net lifetime
taxes as a share of earnings. Convert this rate, currently an implicit tax
on earnings, into an explicit residual payroll tax, and endow the Social
Security Trust Fund with property rights over the revenue from this
residual payroll tax. The remaining portion of the current payroll tax
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would be transformed into contributions to personal saving accounts;
(3) Securitize the revenue of the residual payroll tax, creating new
‘Covered Wage Bill’ (CWB) securities. Set their prices in competitive
financial markets;
(4) Change the social security benefit formula to link benefits to the
overall financial return achieved by the Trust Fund. The continuation benefits to the initial elderly are almost identical to the current
ones. Benefits for initial workers are similar to the current ones
because they would initially get portfolios heavily invested in CWB
securities. Still, initial workers would benefit from the cut in the
political risk they currently bear; and
(5) Allow each participant to select from a limited set of balanced
portfolios and to choose his own asset manager to administer his
personal account assets.
In other words, this process involves relabeling the difference between
social security projected future benefits versus future taxes as an explicit
residual tax, specified as a percentage of covered payroll. The Trust Fund
would then be endowed with property rights to the future revenue collected by the residual tax. No new explicit public debt is issued, and no new
debt-servicing costs appear. The CWB securities would reflect the value of
the residual tax revenue, defined as the dividend on the new CWB securities. This cash flow would be owed by future participants (contributors)
rather than the federal government. Finally, there would be no government guarantee on the CWB dividend payout: if the covered wage bill
varied for any reason (e.g. due to demographic, productivity, or other
shocks), only the owners of the CWB securities would be affected. Holders
of CWB securities would take a loss if dividend growth fell below expectations, and they would appropriate any gains when dividend growth was
above expectations. The fact that CWB securities would behave like equity
protects fiscal stability, i.e. protects beneficiaries of federal transfers and
taxpayers.4 After relabelling PAYGO as individual accounts, the addition of
property rights makes the system fully transparent, cutting political risk and
allowing access to financial markets.
In order to implement this strategy, current social security benefit formulas based on workers’ years of service and Average Indexed Monthly
Earnings (AIME) would be replaced by a rule-based system of personal
accounts. Initially, active workers would be issued shares in the Social
Security Trust Fund, and its net asset value would be the value of the
Trust Fund including the CWB securities, divided by the number of shares
outstanding. Contributions by active workers would purchase additional
shares, while retirees would sell shares back to finance a pension or to
purchase an annuity. Here risks would be shared only among participants
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in proportion to the number of shares each held, just as in DC pension
plans. Retirees would be given variable annuities backed by CWB securities,
so the risks transferred to pensioners would be much smaller than feasible
in current financial markets.
Later, individual choice would be feasible; for instance, market-based
social security could offer retirees a choice between variable annuities
indexed to a portfolio that holds CPI-indexed CWB securities (for maximum stability), or a balanced portfolio offered to active participants.
Annuities might pass along to members the risk that the life table itself
could change, along the lines of the CREF annuity formula pioneered by
TIAA–CREF in the USA. Alternatively a retiree could be offered a fixed
annuity from a life-insurance company.
The innovation under this approach is that the social security system
offers no guarantees to participants as a group. Of course, workers and
retirees may purchase guarantees from issuers of fixed-income securities in
the capital market, and participants could be allowed to sell their claims on
market-based social security to outside investors, provided that the funds
raised would purchase annuities from life insurers meeting solvency conditions. Naturally supervision of life insurers would continue to be necessary, since otherwise insurers might select risky asset portfolios and then
hope for a bailout via an implicit government guarantee (Gollier 2005).
One condition that all these arrangements must meet is asset–liability
matching. In other words, the value of CWB securities of any given type
held in the Trust Fund must equal the value of program liabilities. This
ensures that the sum of payouts linked to the returns of each type of CWB
security is equal to the combined dividends earned by all the CWB securities of that same type in any state of nature.
Transition Costs. Let us explain why this transition proposal does not
increase the public debt and does not require decade-long consumption
sacrifices, despite achieving a new situation which appears to be full
funding. The label ‘funding’ has been assigned three different meanings,
creating some confusion. The first type of funding, also called ‘narrow’ or
‘financial’, is the degree to which benefit promises are backed by assets
protected with property rights such as securities and real estate. The degree
of narrow funding of an employer pension plan is independent from the
paths of national saving and of the public debt (Bernheim and Shoven
1988).
The second type of funding is the degree to which changes in benefit
promises translate into changes in national savings, and therefore into
changes in consumption, possibly sacrifices, redistributing across generations. This is ‘ultimate’ or ‘broad’ funding, which depends on changes in
the stock of voluntary savings (tax-favored and normal financial saving,
housing equity), changes in the national debt, nationalizations and
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privatizations, and changes in government programs which create intergenerational transfers such as health subsidies for the old and educational
subsidies (Lee 1994). Third, consider ‘fiscal’ funding. This is the degree to
which changes in benefit liabilities bring about changes in the net fiscal
debt, or affect the riskiness of the payment profile of the net public debt.
For this purpose, the ‘net public debt’ is the standard public debt, minus
publicly owned assets, plus the implicit fiscal debt to insolvent health and
old-age benefit programs.5
The gains from market-based social security come from narrow funding.
The consumption sacrifices are caused by increases in broad funding and
the fiscally costly ‘transition costs’ are caused by restructuring of fiscal
funding. The transition path analyzed in this paper achieves narrow funding without touching either broad or fiscal funding.
Responding to Aggregate Shocks. The next issue is to specify how the
proposed system would adjust if uninsurable shocks strike, which could
involve discretionary ex post adjustments; adopting prespecified rules ex
ante; or some blend of the two. In provident funds and DB corporate
plans, the fiduciaries are generally given some discretion to adjust
parameters ex post, so as to preserve solvency, and sometimes this works
well but the last decade of DB failures in the USA underscores the risk in
this approach.
Alternatively, preset rules can be derived to preserve cash-flow equilibrium, though a problem with such cash-flow rules is that they tend not to
respond to predictable events but rather delay action until cash-flow problems materialize. As an example, the Swedish Notional Account program
maintains PAYGO financing, while crediting benefit promises to each
participant’s ‘notional’ account with a hypothetical interest rate. If the
economy maintained a steady growth path, the internal rate of return on
social security taxes would equal the growth rate of payroll tax revenue; in
reality, however, shocks produce substantial cash flow deficits or surplus
that can last for decades and whose accumulated value may attain 8 percent
of GDP (Valdés-Prieto 2000). In addition, the Swedish benefit formula
deviates from the theoretical ideal by crediting individual accounts with
an interest rate that equals the growth rate of average covered wages rather
than the growth of payroll tax revenue. In general, a notional account
approach is backward rather than forward looking, as it does not attempt
to match assets and liabilities on a continuing basis; the latter would
require a reliable method to construct projections such as those provided
by prices in a competitive financial market. Instead, the Swedish system
relies on projections made by a single government bureau which then
adjusts benefits in an ad hoc manner. This makes the system subject to
political risk all over again.
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Some forward-looking rules are in use in financial markets, as in the case
of annuities where longevity and investment risks are absorbed by life
insurance companies, and by the issuers of bonds in which assets are
invested. The DC rule used by mutual funds also meets this objective, as
uninsurable aggregate financial shocks are allocated among plan members
in proportion to the market value of their claims on the plan.
In the present context, let us consider the case where a panic struck
financial markets and knocked down the value of the CWB securities. If all
CWB securities were perpetuities, a solvent social security program would
not have to sell any of its holdings because all benefits could be paid in full
using the dividend payout of CWB securities—which equals the revenue of
the residual payroll tax plus the revenue from new contributions. Of course
retirees would sell some of their holdings to younger participants every
month, and since these trade at prices set in financial markets, a panic
there affects the terms of trade. If this change is permanent, a response by
participants is not a problem but rather is economically justified.6 Similarly, a pure PAYGO system would have to adopt new legislation if news
arrived to modify expected payroll tax revenues or benefits. By contrast, a
rule-based approach as proposed here offers immediate and objective
adjustments that guarantee continued solvency. For example, if longevity
were to rise faster than anticipated, holders of variable annuities and the
life insurance companies that issued the fixed annuities would take a loss.
If new information were to show that the aggregate future payout of the
CWB securities held by younger participants would fall, benefits would have
to be cut to restore solvency. Of course provident workers facing this loss
would respond both by deferring retirement and raising their saving rates.
Therefore, a market-based social security program that allowed flexibility in
the contribution rate in response to forward-looking changes could actually reduce risk exposure.

Financial Market Implications
Next we turn to the possible financial market implications of moving to a
market-based social security system, and we also discuss ways to organize the
new market for asset management services provided to participants.
Access to a More Efficient Portfolio. Initially, the social security program
would trade CWB securities sufficient to establish pricing, which would be a
small volume relative to the complete stock of CWB securities. This alone
would create new financial markets. Subsequently, social security may
gradually trade much larger blocks of CWB securities with outside investors.
The literature suggests that real-world investors are often beset by information deficiencies and behavioral quirks making them less skilled than
professional asset managers (Mitchell and Utkus 2004). In addition, small
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investors pay more for trading than do large institutional investors. For
both reasons, having the government participate in financial markets via
the CWBs is likely to have important effects. Currently, the portfolio owned
by the social security system is undiversified, and it is unlikely to be optimal
for all or most workers; accordingly, as Valdés-Prieto (2002 and 2005a)
suggests, allowing people to exchange some CWBs for equities could
achieve significant diversification gains. Of course, the value of this diversification depends also on the holdings of human capital, housing, and
company-based pensions.
Creation of New Markets. It is also likely that the payment profile of CWB
securities across states of nature is not spanned by the payment profiles of
current financial assets, so if the social security program were to sell small
amounts of CWB securities, it would immediately create new financial
markets.7 Completing the financial markets could generate substantial
new value (Shiller 1993), though there is a theoretical possibility that if
markets remain incomplete after the new security is introduced, this could
make people worse off (Hart 1975).8 In practice, we believe that CWB
securities would be attractive investments for domestic corporate and
occupational pension plans seeking to curtail exposure to inflation risk,
because the covered wage bill is protected from inflation (at least in the
medium term). Trade of CWB securities between countries would also
permit participants to access new international risk diversification, that is
to permit trade in aggregate human capital.9
Organizing the Asset Management Market. If workers are to be required to
save in personal accounts, it would be important to make the market
efficient and competitive, and respond to changes in optimal portfolio
weights over time. Since most participants are insufficiently financially
literate to design balanced portfolios and adjust them over time, some
oppose letting individual workers select their own investment options in
their personal accounts (Kotlikoff and Burns 2004). An obvious solution
would be to pass the responsibility for balancing and updating portfolios to
the experts, while ensuring that the experts compete among themselves.
For example, asset managers could be required to offer just a handful of
balanced portfolios and then each participant could be asked to choose a
single balanced portfolio; this has been implemented in Chile, for instance.
Participants would be well protected from the downside risk of investing in
equities, because these portfolios would hold significant shares in CWB
securities and corporate and government bonds.10
Competition between the asset managers would allow participants to
switch between competing registered asset managers; further, asset management firms could set their own commission levels, with competition
preventing commissions from being raised to exorbitant levels. One way to
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achieve intense price rivalry and keep cross-selling low would be to rely on
large employers, employer associations, and unions to find low-cost asset
managers as in the Netherlands and Denmark. Another approach would
offer participants a ‘bidding service’, where participants can identify the
asset management company that would charge them the least, identified
via bidding contests (Valdés-Prieto 2005b). Such a service would create a
distribution channel that avoids contacting each participant, while at the
same time reducing participants’ information costs.

Redistributive Concerns
Next we turn to an assessment of how this plan for market-based social
security affects redistribution within and between generations.11 Some
have worried that moving away from the current system would undo social
security redistribution within cohorts, as they argue that the current oldage benefit formula replaces a larger share of previous earnings for lower
than higher earners. But the reality is different: in fact, very little redistribution is achieved by the US social security system. For instance, Gustman
and Steinmeier (2000) show that less than 3 percent of current social
security payroll tax revenue is redistributed across income deciles. This is
because most of the redistribution in the benefit formula is offset within
households, since relatively lower-paid wives receive bigger benefits that
offset the smaller benefits going to their well-paid husbands. Consequently,
adopting individual accounts would not alter the system’s degree of redistribution. In fact with a progressive income tax, more redistribution can be
achieved by an individual accounts system.12
Another issue is whether intergenerational risk-sharing would be improved by market-based social security. On the one hand, the availability
of CWB securities in financial markets would allow young participants and
other investors to sell guarantees to participants in their 70s and beyond,
enhancing intergenerational risk-sharing. Moreover, if the investors included institutions representing even younger persons (e.g. wealthy dynasties altruistic toward the welfare of grandchildren, or wealthy foundations
devoted to child welfare), risk-sharing could span 100 years. On the other
hand, governments can be thought of as even longer-lived so that PAYGO
finance offers the potential for even longer risk-sharing. Yet as we have
seen, permitting this implies allowing legislators to make discretionary and
unpredictable decisions. We would argue that if market-based social security is coupled with CWB securities, the span of generations covered by
financial market trades can replicate that achieved by conventional
PAYGO social security, while offering less political risk, a wider set of
portfolios, and more individual choice.
A separate issue concerns the possibility that poorer generations might
need to be helped by richer generations. This has been accomplished by
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Congress under discretionary social security rules by changing the level of
prefunding for promised liabilities. That is, poorer generations (e.g. during the Depression) spent more than they paid into the Trust Fund, while
richer generations have been forced to build it up. Yet an alternative would
be to change the value of the net public debt as well as the present
discounted value of promised Medicare benefits. If a government wanted
to improve the welfare of future generations, it could always do so by
running a budget surplus and using it to purchase CWB securities in the
market. The revenue from these bonds could then be used to pay a subsidy
to covered labor earnings, or the securities could simply be cancelled and
the residual payroll tax cut proportionately. Therefore, the adoption of
market-based social security does not constrain intergenerational redistribution in any way.

Credibility of the Mandate to Pay the Residual Payroll
Tax
Will future governments be willing to mandate workers to pay the residual
payroll tax, if many holders of CWB securities are domestic investors or
even foreign investors? There is the notion that the highest credibility that
the residual payroll tax will be levied is achieved by allocating the benefits
of that revenue to the most powerful interest group. If retirees are assumed
to be the most powerful interest group, then to maximize credibility, they
and not investors should receive all the revenue from the residual payroll
tax (Bovenberg 2005).13
However, the historical evidence shows that frequently the promises to
retirees have been broken, so their political strength must have been
limited. Although retirees have created national political parties in some
countries, in many episodes they have borne the brunt of the cost of fiscal
crises. Moreover, governments can be pressed into action by entities different from interest groups. Investors in financial markets can put significant
constraints on fiscal behavior too, without any need to coordinate among
themselves, simply by moving their money out when a government fails to
meet its promises. Many governments have opened up the capital account
of the Balance of Payments to take advantage of the gains from full
participation in the world economy, and this has increased the ability of
international investors to move their funds when risk increases.
The contrast between retirees and investors blurs under market-based
social security. Older and retired participants are highly likely to keep claims
to a big share of the CWB securities, simply because these will be the safest
investments available. Therefore, retirees and older workers will contribute
their political clout to ensure respect for their property rights over the
residual payroll tax paid by the younger workers. This political clout would
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combine with the market pressure applied by investors, to keep the government willing to mandate active workers to pay the residual payroll tax.
Now consider the polar opposite objection: because the revenue of CWB
securities relies on the willingness of the government to mandate workers
to pay the residual payroll tax, CWB securities would be ‘owed’ by the
government. This is a mistake, because the existence of most privately
owned cash flows relies on the continuing use of force by the government.
Corporations keep their machinery because the government is willing to
use force to stop thieves, and landlords collect rents because governments
are willing to expel intruders. If it appears bizarre to count all these cash
flows as ‘owed’ by the government, then counting CWB securities as fiscal
liabilities is equally inappropriate.

Conclusions
We have shown that implementing market-based social security reforms
can enhance well-being, by allowing risk diversification and trading in
guarantees on the underlying economic and demographic risks. A key
benefit of this approach is that participants may gain access to new financial
markets rather than having the government impose risk and return portfolios unlikely to be optimal for all participants. Another advantage of a
market-based approach to social security is that the system can be better
adapted to suit individual needs. For example, if risk tolerance falls with
age, participants can move to safer pension portfolios, a practice not
permitted when a centrally run PAYGO social security system imposes
uniform risk levels on everyone. We also show that between- and withincohort redistribution can exist under market-based social security.
Covered wage bill securities are a key element of this plan. It is important
to underscore the fact that these would be the responsibility of future
workers who pay the residual payroll tax to social security so that this
residual tax acknowledges the ‘legacy debt’ implicit in the starting point
of a PAYGO system. The role of government would be limited to ensuring
the obligation that workers pay the residual payroll tax. Shocks to economic growth or fertility are borne by owners of the CWB securities,
because taxpayers do not guarantee the revenue of the residual payroll
tax. Similarly, CWB owners appropriate the ensuing gains in the event of
better-than-expected economic performance.
In this sense, the new securities are akin to equity and are not part of the
public debt. Yet these CWB securities are much safer than equities over the
business cycle, because the residual payroll tax backing them is proportional to the covered wage bill which tends to be more stable than profits at
horizons shorter than ten years. In addition, nominal wages tend to keep
up with inflation in the medium term, as compared to nominal corporate
or treasury bonds. Moreover, CWB securities are perpetual (having no
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expiry date), so renewal risk and vulnerability to investor panics are minimal. Portfolios containing a substantial share of CWB securities also reduce replacement rate risk (cf. Burtless 2000).
As a final benefit, these CWB securities would permit financial markets
to hedge and diversify the risk in aggregate human capital (reflected in
the present discounted value of earnings). Indeed CWB securities would
permit all GDP to be traded, as espoused by Shiller (1993). The young as a
group, who hold substantial human capital, would benefit by choosing a
portfolio short on human capital and long in corporate securities, while the
old as a group would benefit by choosing a portfolio heavy in human
capital (Merton 1983). If market-based social security reduces the equilibrium equity risk premium through this route, higher levels of innovative
risk-taking would be supported, and growth rates could increase. In addition, new CWB securities can permit investors to hedge separately shocks
to real average earnings, and covered employment (influenced by demographic risks and labor force participation trends). This separation is
possible because the revenue of the residual payroll tax can always be
decomposed in this way. These gains would be available to facilitate step
(1) in the proposal, where parameters are adjusted to resolve the initial
insolvency situation.

Endnotes
1. This has been noted by Browning (1975), Tabellini (1991), and Casamatta et al.
(2000).
2. Legislation to index the minimum pension to the consumer price index in
Mexico was passed only in 1989, after the large inflation of the 1980s wiped out
the value of most social security benefits.
3. Insolvency is compatible with a cash-flow surplus for a few decades, as with the US
social security system; see OASDI (2005).
4. Payouts on CWB securities could be uniform, meaning that a simple pro rata
share of the total dividend payout would be received in the future, or they could
take other shapes. Valdés-Prieto (2005a) conjectures that one CWB security type
would include wage-indexed bonds, while others could be indexed to demography and participation in the covered labor force or to CPI-indexed bonds.
5. For example, if the introduction of individual-account-based social security de
novo (in a country with no previous social security) and the ensuing accumulation of pension funds, induces the political system to issue new public debt in
equal amounts, then the degree of fiscal funding falls as much as when PAYGO
financed social security is introduced (Holzmann 2005: 83). If future generations service this ‘legacy debt’ with an extra payroll tax, then the parallel with
balanced PAYGO finance becomes exact.
6. Valdés-Prieto (2005a) argues that properly chosen option contracts such as
collars between the portfolios held by active participants and retirees could
help insulate prices for twelve months ahead without interfering in the market’s
valuation of the CWB bonds.
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7. Financial innovation is efficient when short sales of the new security are effectively limited by costs, which seems to be the case (Allen and Gale 1994).
8. An important example provided by Dow (1998) considers a single consumption
good with asymmetric information. In this example, risk-averse traders use the
new market to hedge their positions in a preexisting security, but this reduces
liquidity in the old market, and this last effect dominates.
9. For instance, European and Japanese corporate pensions would benefit from
buying US CWBs; emerging nation Central Banks might also desire to hold a
portion of their international reserves in CWB securities issued by American
workers versus nominal bonds. The correlation between shocks to the covered
wage bill across countries is likely to be below unity after taking into account
real exchange rate risk.
10. A sophisticated participant who preferred more variety, even at higher cost,
could allocate voluntary saving and debt to undo the balanced portfolio.
11. An important redistribution question refers to poverty-based assistance for the
elderly. This issue is unrelated to market-based social security, because such
support is generally provided by a separate tax-financed scheme, as with the US
Supplemental Security Income program.
12. Another important issue is integration of disability insurance and survivorship
insurance, which would remain mandatory under market-based social security. A
capital payment would be made into the individual accounts of beneficiaries equal
to the difference between the market price of a set of immediate annuities for the
beneficiaries, whose initial amounts are specified by law, and the account balance
as of the date of the claim. This means that the accounts would help participants
when they need it most. In addition, the indemnity would be larger for those who
become disabled relatively young, compared to that for those falling disabled
closer to retirement. The premium for this insurance can also be determined by
bidding contests. Contrary to Diamond and Orszag (2004), market-based social
security can treat the disabled, widows, and orphans as generously as the society
deems necessary, and the premium will adjust accordingly.
13. This objection was first raised by Andrea Prat in an Economic Policy panel
discussion in October 2004 and then refined by Bovenberg (2005). This is my
first opportunity to respond.
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